Learned predictiveness influences rapid attentional capture:Evidence From the Dot Probe Task by Le Pelley, Mike E. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1037/a0033700
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Le Pelley, M. E., Vadillo Nistal, M., & Luque, D. (2013). Learned predictiveness influences rapid attentional
capture: Evidence From the Dot Probe Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 39(6), 1888-1900. 10.1037/a0033700
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
 1 
 
Learned predictiveness influences rapid attentional capture: 
Evidence from the dot probe task 
 
Mike E. Le Pelley 1,2 
Miguel Vadillo 3 
David Luque 4 
 
1  School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 
2  School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK 
3  Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, UK 
4  School of Psychology, University of Málaga, Málaga, Spain 
 
 
Running head: Predictiveness and attentional capture 
 
Please address correspondence to 
Dr Mike Le Pelley 
School of Psychology 
University of New South Wales 
Sydney NSW 2052 
Australia 
 
Tel: +61 2 9385 1294  
Email: m.lepelley@unsw.edu.au 
 
 2 
Abstract 
Attentional theories of associative learning and categorization propose that learning 
about the predictiveness of a stimulus influences the amount of attention that is paid to 
that stimulus. Three experiments tested this idea by looking at the extent to which 
stimuli that had previously been experienced as predictive or nonpredictive in a 
categorization task were able to capture attention in a dot probe task. Consistent with 
certain attentional theories of learning, responses to the dot probe were faster when it 
appeared in a location cued by a predictive stimulus as compared to a location cued by a 
nonpredictive stimulus. This result was obtained only with short (250 or 350ms) but not 
long (1000ms) delays between onset of the stimuli and the dot probe, suggesting that the 
observed spatial cueing effect reflects the operation of a relatively rapid, automatic 
process. These findings are consistent with the approach to the relationship between 
attention and learning taken by the class of models exemplified by Mackintosh’s theory 
(1975). 
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Attention provides the gateway between the mass of information in the world, and the 
relatively small subset of that information that we select for further analysis or action. 
What, then, determines the stimuli that will be selected under a given set of 
circumstances? Much of the research related to this issue that is described in the 
cognitive psychology literature has focused on the “intrinsic” perceptual and emotional 
properties of stimuli. For example, a stimulus is more likely to capture attention if it is 
highly perceptually salient (e.g., if it has an abrupt onset, or a bright colour: Folk, 
Remington & Johnston, 1992), or if it is “emotionally relevant”: negative mood states 
bias attention towards threatening information (MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986), 
while positive mood states bias attention to desirable, rewarding stimuli (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2007). A second line of research has instead examined the ability of external 
events to modulate attention to stimuli. For example, the influence of attention to a 
stimulus persists for longer if selection of that stimulus is highly rewarded, than if it is 
only weakly rewarded (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). 
While the studies described above have considered the effects of stimulus and 
reward properties on attentional selection in isolation, recent research suggests that we 
should also consider them in combination (Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011; Della 
Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Hickey, Chelazzi & Theeuwes, 2010; Kiss, Driver & Eimer, 
2009; Le Pelley, Mitchell & Johnson, 2013). For example, Della Libera and Chelazzi 
(2009) gave participants training on a task in which selection of certain shapes was 
typically followed by high reward (€0.10) while selection of other shapes was typically 
followed by low reward (€0.01). After extensive training, shapes that predicted high-
value outcomes were shown to be easier to select when serving as targets (Experiment 
2), and more difficult to reject when serving as distractors (Experiment 1), compared to 
shapes that predicted low-value outcomes. Using a visual search task, Anderson et al. 
(2011) similarly demonstrated that presenting cues previously associated with high-
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value reward as distractors led to a slowing of search, as compared to cues previously 
associated with low-value reward. These findings suggest that cues associated with 
high-value outcomes are more likely to capture attention than those paired with low-
value outcomes; that is, participants learn to attend to cues as a function of the value of 
the reward with which they are paired. Consequently these studies can be described as 
demonstrating an influence of learned value on attention. 
Other studies of associative learning in both humans and nonhuman animals 
suggest that the learned predictiveness of a stimulus might also be a determinant of 
attention to that stimulus (for reviews, see Le Pelley, 2004; Mitchell & Le Pelley, 
2010). The predictiveness of a stimulus refers to the accuracy with which the occurrence 
of that stimulus allows subsequent events to be predicted. A predictive stimulus is one 
that is consistently followed by the same outcome (which can be of high or low value, 
such that predictiveness and learned value are orthogonal); a nonpredictive stimulus is 
not. In a typical experiment, participants learn during Phase 1 that certain stimuli are 
predictive of outcomes, while others are not1. In a subsequent Phase 2 involving new 
stimulus–outcome contingencies, human participants typically learn faster about stimuli 
previously experienced as predictive than those previously experienced as nonpredictive 
(e.g., Bonardi, Graham, Hall & Mitchell, 2005; Kruschke, 1996; Le Pelley & McLaren, 
2003; Le Pelley, Suret & Beesley, 2009; Le Pelley, Turnbull, Reimers & Knipe, 2010). 
Such findings support the suggestion that attention is modulated by learned 
predictiveness, as long as it is assumed that differences in the rate of learning about 
stimuli during Phase 2 reflect differences in attention to those stimuli, as suggested by 
“attentional” theories of associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; 
Mackintosh, 1975). However, this assumption is questionable. After all, the putative 
relationship between attention and rate of learning has been invoked only to account for 
the results of experiments of this kind, and has received little external validation in the 
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cognitive psychology literature. Consequently, the possibility remains open that what is 
influenced by predictiveness, and what in turn influences learning, is not attention but 
rather an associability parameter that merely modulates the rate at which stimuli enter 
into associations; a “non-attentional” model along these lines has been proposed by 
Honey, Close and Lin (2010; see also Oswald et al., 2001). Alternatively, one could 
appeal to memory processes, rather than attention. Perhaps stimuli experienced as 
predictive during Phase 1 develop stronger and/or more distinct representations in 
memory than those experienced as nonpredictive, and this allows information 
experienced in Phase 2 to be more accurately addressed to (associated with) the correct 
stimulus representation for predictive stimuli than nonpredictive stimuli (see Le Pelley, 
Reimers, et al., 2010). Yet another non-attentional account of these rate-of-learning 
studies has recently been proposed, in terms of an “inferential–attribution” process 
(Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo & Lovibond, 2012).  
A growing set of studies has taken a more direct approach to investigating the 
putative relationship between learned predictiveness and attention, by looking at the 
effect of predictiveness on measures of attention that have previously been validated in 
the cognitive psychology literature. In particular, predictiveness has been shown to 
influence overt attention, measured in terms of gaze location (Beesley & Le Pelley, 
2011; Kruschke, Kappenman & Hetrick, 2005; Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011; 
Wills, Lavric, Croft & Hodgson, 2007). However, shifting attention does not necessarily 
entail eye movements. Visual performance can be enhanced at the site where attention is 
directed without changing fixation (Jonides, 1981; Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1999). Hence 
it is desirable to develop a test of the influence of learned predictiveness on attention 
that does not rely on eye gaze. Moreover, all of these previous gaze-based studies have 
demonstrated a bias in overt attention at the point at which participants made their 
categorization response. It is perhaps unsurprising that participants are more likely to 
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pay attention to a stimulus during a categorization task if identification of that stimulus 
is necessary for making a correct categorization response. A more powerful finding 
would be a demonstration that learning about the predictiveness of stimuli produces a 
more general attentional bias with regard to those stimuli that operates even when it is 
not required, and when it may even hinder performance. Finally, and more 
pragmatically, eye tracking apparatus is typically expensive, intrusive and cumbersome. 
Consequently, it is not well-suited for use with large participant samples, or for testing 
outside the laboratory – for example with children in schools, or with patients in in-
patient facilities. This last point is pertinent, given that a dysfunction of the relationship 
between learning and attention has been implicated in schizophrenia (Morris, Griffiths, 
Le Pelley & Weickert, 2012) , Parkinson’s Disease (Gauntlett-Gilbert, Roberts & 
Brown, 1999; Hampshire & Owen, 2010), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Hampshire 
& Owen, 2010), as well as certain types of brain injury (Owen et al., 1991). It would 
therefore be advantageous to develop a procedure to measure the relationship between 
attention and learning that can be implemented on any standard computer without 
special equipment, and can be used with multiple participants simultaneously. 
Towards this end, the current experiments examined the influence of 
predictiveness on attentional capture using a variant of the spatial cueing task (Posner, 
Nissen & Ogden, 1978). It is well established that responses to targets appearing in an 
attended location are faster than to targets appearing in an unattended location (Posner, 
1980; Posner, Snyder & Davidson, 1980). Following this rationale, Folk et al. (1992) 
demonstrated that responses to a target were faster when it appeared in a location 
previously occupied by a cue defined in terms of an abrupt onset or a discontinuity in 
colour. Similarly, on each trial of MacLeod et al.’s (1986) dot probe task, a pair of 
words appeared – one threat-related (e.g., injury) and the other neutral. Anxious 
participants were faster to identify a target (a small dot) when it subsequently appeared 
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in the location that had been occupied by the threat-related word as compared to the 
neutral word. The implication of these studies is that stimuli defined in terms of abrupt 
onsets, colour discontinuities, or emotional valence, can capture attentional resources. 
This type of cueing procedure is the original and classic paradigm used for 
investigating the operation of attentional processes in humans, but has never before 
been used to assess the relationship between attention and learned predictiveness. In the 
current experiments, we use this approach to investigate whether stimuli that differ in 
predictiveness also differ in the extent to which they capture spatial attention, and in 
Experiments 2 and 3 we go on to look at the timecourse over which this capture occurs. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 involved two tasks. The first was described to participants as a 
categorization task, with the design shown in Table 1. On each trial, two stimuli 
appeared: a square filled with one of two shades of green (labelled Gre1 and Gre2), and 
a set of oblique lines at one of two orientations (Lin1 and Lin2; see Supplementary 
Materials Figure S1). Participants categorized this pair of stimuli into one of two 
categories by making an appropriate response, with immediate corrective feedback 
provided. For participants in condition “Green Predictive”, the shade of green predicted 
the correct categorization response and the orientation of the lines was nonpredictive: 
presence of Gre1 indicated that response R1 was correct, presence of Gre2 indicated 
that response R2 was correct, while Lin1 and Lin2 provided no information on the 
correct response. For participants in condition “Lines Predictive” the orientation of the 
lines was predictive of the correct response and shade of green was nonpredictive. If 
predictiveness influences attention, then this categorization task should cause 
participants to come to attend more strongly to the stimuli belonging to the predictive 
dimension than to those belonging to the nonpredictive dimension. 
The second task was designed to assess any such difference in attention, using a 
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variant of the dot probe procedure. On each trial one of the green squares and one of the 
sets of oblique lines appeared briefly on either side of the screen. A dot probe target 
could then appear in the location previously occupied by one of these cues, and was 
equally likely to appear in the location cued by the stimulus that had been predictive 
during the categorization task as the location cued by the stimulus that had been 
nonpredictive. Hence both stimuli were equally valid as cues during the dot probe task. 
If the stimulus that was predictive during the categorization task was more likely to 
capture attention, however, then responses to the target should be faster when it 
appeared in the location cued by this stimulus, as compared to the location cued by the 
nonpredictive stimulus. 
These two tasks alternated across phases – Experiment 1 contained four task 
phases, in the order: categorization, dot probe, categorization, dot probe. This procedure 
meant that learning about the categorization predictiveness of cues was “topped up” 
prior to each iteration of a relatively short test on the dot probe task. 
Method 
Participants and apparatus.  Eleven Cardiff University students (ten female) took 
part in exchange for course credit, and were tested individually in a dim, quiet room. 
Stimuli were presented on a 43.2 cm monitor, and stimulus presentation was controlled 
by a Visual Basic program. Timing used Windows API QueryPerformance functions for 
millisecond resolution. Responses were made using the keyboard, and error signals 
were beeps given over headphones. 
Stimuli.  The two green squares had red–green–blue colour values of (0, 255, 0) 
and (0, 160, 0), with sides subtending 3.42° visual angle from a viewing distance of 
60cm. The two oblique line stimuli comprised sets of cyan lines (thickness .34° visual 
angle) sloping upwards to the right at an angle of either 33° or 57°, enclosed within a 
black square background with sides 3.42° visual angle. Stimuli are shown in 
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Supplementary Materials Figure S1. 
These green square and oblique line stimuli were presented centrally in white 
square frames with sides subtending 3.76°, which were positioned either side of a small 
fixation cross located in the centre of the screen; the distance from the centre of the 
cross to the centre of each box subtended 5.30°. The target in the dot probe task was a 
white equilateral triangle with side length subtending 2.22°. This would appear centrally 
in one of the white square frames. The screen background was black. 
Design.  Two between-subjects conditions were created by varying the predictive 
dimension during the categorization task. Participants were initially assigned randomly 
to conditions, and following the exclusions described below replacements were run to 
ensure equal numbers in each condition. Overall, four participants were tested in 
condition Green Predictive and seven in condition Lines Predictive. Particular values on 
each stimulus dimension were randomly assigned to the labels shown in Table 1 for 
each participant; e.g., for some participants in condition Lines Predictive, the label Lin1 
in Table 1 referred to lines at 33° to the horizontal and Lin2 referred to lines at 57°, 
while for others this assignment was reversed. 
Experiment 1 contained four task phases, in the order: categorization task, dot 
probe task, categorization task, dot probe task. Each phase of the categorization task 
was split into blocks. Each block contained four trials, with each of the stimulus pairs 
shown in Table 1 appearing once in random order. The first phase of the categorization 
task had 12 blocks, and the second phase had 8 blocks. Across blocks, for each stimulus 
pair the predictive stimulus appeared equally often on the left and on the right. 
On each trial of the dot probe task, one of the four stimulus pairs shown in Table 1 
appeared as the cue. This pair could appear with the green square on the left or on the 
right. On target-present trials, the target could subsequently appear on the left or the 
right. For target-present trials, every combination of stimulus pair, stimulus position, 
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and target position appeared once during each phase of the dot probe task (giving 4×2×2 
= 16 target-present trials). Each phase of the dot probe task also included 8 target-absent 
trials; one for each combination of stimulus pair and stimulus position. The 24 trials of 
each phase of the dot probe task were presented in random order. 
Procedure.  Participants received written and oral descriptions of the tasks. Initial 
instructions described the categorization task. Participants were told that (i) on each trial 
a cross would appear in the centre of the screen and that they should keep their eyes 
fixed on it throughout the trial; (ii) a pair of stimuli would then be presented; (iii) their 
task was to decide if that pair of stimuli belonged to category 1 (in which case they 
should press the C key) or to category 2 (M key); (iv) they would start out guessing but 
that on the basis of feedback their decisions should become more accurate; (v) they 
should make as few errors as possible; (vi) they should respond within 3s, but should 
not anticipate the stimuli. There followed four practice trials using stimuli that were not 
encountered in the main body of the experiment and with no feedback provided. 
Following these practice trials, participants were asked if they had maintained central 
fixation throughout each trial; if they had not, the practice trials were repeated. 
Participants then received instructions relating to the dot probe task as follows: (i) 
a cross would appear in the centre of the screen and that it was very important that their 
eyes remained fixed on it; (ii) two stimuli would be presented briefly; (iii) after these 
stimuli disappeared, the target might appear to the left or right of the central cross; (iv) 
if this target appeared, they should press the spacebar, and if it did not appear, they 
should do nothing; (v) they should respond as quickly as possible, but should not 
anticipate the target. There followed four practice trials of this task (three target-present 
and one target-absent), using stimuli not encountered in the body of the experiment. If 
participants reported not maintaining fixation on these trials, they were repeated. 
Participants were then shown the four stimuli to be used in the body of the 
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experiment, before the experiment began. 
Each trial of the categorization task began with the appearance of the fixation 
cross flanked by the two empty white frames. After 1000ms, the stimulus pair appeared 
in these frames. If participants made the correct category response, the word “Correct” 
appeared in the centre of the screen; if they made the incorrect response, “Wrong” 
appeared. If a response was made within 150ms, the message “Do not anticipate the 
stimuli” appeared. If participants did not make a response within 3s, the message “You 
took too long” appeared. All non-“correct” feedback was accompanied by an error 
signal. Feedback remained on screen for 800ms; the screen then cleared and the next 
trial began after 600ms. After every eight trials of the categorization task participants 
were told how many errors they had made in those eight trials, and their mean response 
time (RT, excluding any anticipations or timeouts). This information remained on-
screen for 3s before the experiment proceeded. 
After the first phase of the categorization task, participants read a reminder of the 
instructions for the dot probe task. Figure 1 shows a schematic of a target-present trial 
of this task. Each trial began with presentation of the fixation cross flanked by two 
white frames. After 1000ms, the stimulus pair was presented for 150ms in these frames, 
and then disappeared. On target-present trials, the dot probe appeared after a delay of 
200ms, giving a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 350ms between presentation of 
the stimulus pair and the dot probe. If participants pressed the spacebar within 2000ms, 
the screen cleared and the next trial began after an interval of 600ms. If participants did 
not press the spacebar within 2000ms on target-present trials, a timeout error signal was 
given and the experiment moved to the next trial. Responses within 150ms of the dot 
probe appearing were deemed anticipations and an error signal was given. On target-
absent trials, no dot probe appeared; if participants pressed the spacebar during a 
2150ms window after the cues vanished this was deemed an anticipation, and an error 
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signal was given. If they did not respond, then after this window had elapsed the next 
trial proceeded. After 16 trials of the dot probe task participants were told how many 
anticipations they had made during those trials, and mean RT on target-present trials. 
The procedure for the second categorization and dot probe phases was the same. 
Instructions prior to each phase stated which task participants would be carrying out in 
that phase, and reminded them of the importance of maintaining fixation on each trial. 
Results 
An influence of predictiveness on spatial cueing in the dot probe task could only be 
expected if participants managed to learn about the differential predictiveness of the 
cues involved during the categorization task. Following Le Pelley and McLaren (2003), 
a selection criterion of 60% correct categorization responses averaged across all blocks 
of the categorization task was imposed (chance performance = 50% correct). Three 
participants (all in condition Lines Predictive) failed to achieve this criterion, and their 
data were excluded from all subsequent analyses. 
The primary focus of this article is the influence of predictiveness on attentional 
capture, as opposed to any “unlearned” influence of stimulus salience (in terms of 
colour, intensity, onset etc). In other words, we are interested in the status of cues as 
predictive or nonpredictive, rather than in the particular identity of these cues (green 
squares or sets of oblique lines). To reflect this focus—and since, following the 
exclusions described above, the number of participants in each condition was equal—
the two between-subjects conditions (Green Predictive and Lines Predictive) were 
combined. In this pooled sample, the label predictive stimuli refers to green squares for 
participants from condition Green Predictive, and sets of oblique lines for participants 
from condition Lines Predictive; nonpredictive stimuli refers to oblique lines for 
participants from condition Green Predictive, and green squares for participants from 
condition Lines Predictive. [See Supplementary Materials for an analysis including 
 13 
condition (Green Predictive versus Lines Predictive) as a between-subjects factor.] 
Figure 2 shows accuracy across training blocks of the categorization task. One-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant effect of block, F(19,133) = 
2.82, ηp2 = .29, p < .001, with accuracy increasing across training (effect size in this and 
all subsequent analyses is partial eta-squared, ηp2). Collapsing across the blocks of each 
phase (Phase 1 being blocks 1-12 and Phase 2 being blocks 13-20) revealed that mean 
accuracy was significantly greater than chance (50%) in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, one-
sample t(7) = 3.39 and 13.7, ηp2 = .62 and .96, p = .012 and p < .001 respectively. 
Accuracy on the dot probe task was very high; across all participants, only one 
anticipation was made on a target-absent trial. The data of main interest relate to the 
target-present trials. Anticipation responses and timeouts (which constituted 1.2% and 
0% of all target-present trials respectively) were removed. Several measures were taken 
to reduce the impact of any outlying response times (RTs). Firstly, RTs were log-
transformed. Secondly, any log RTs lying more than three standard deviations from 
each participant’s mean were excluded as outliers (1.95% of all target-present trials), 
following Sincich (1986).  
Target-present trials of the dot probe task were labelled congruent if the dot probe 
appeared in the location cued by the predictive stimulus from the categorization task, 
and incongruent if the dot probe appeared in the location cued by the nonpredictive 
stimulus. For each participant we calculated the median RT for congruent and 
incongruent trials for each phase of the dot probe task; these data were then averaged 
across participants, and are shown in Figure 3. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
factors of congruence and phase revealed a main effect of congruence, F(1,7) = 15.3, 
ηp2 = .69, p = .006, indicating that across all participants, responses were significantly 
faster on congruent trials than incongruent trials. The observed difference in log RTs 
between congruent and incongruent trials corresponds to an RT difference of 14ms. The 
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main effect of phase and the phase × congruence interaction were nonsignificant, larger 
F(1,7) = .74, both ηp2s < .1, both ps > .40. 
Discussion 
Participants were faster to respond to the appearance of the dot probe when it appeared 
in a location that was cued by a stimulus that had been predictive in the categorization 
task, relative to a stimulus that had been nonpredictive. The implication of this finding 
is that the difference in experienced predictiveness of the stimuli influenced their 
tendency to capture attention during the dot probe task. This relationship between 
predictiveness and attention is exactly that anticipated by attentional theories of 
associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). 
Notably, the attentional capture observed in Experiment 1 occurred even though 
there was no advantage to be gained in shifting attention to the predictive stimulus 
during the dot probe task. That is, because the dot probe was equally likely to appear in 
the location cued by the predictive stimulus as that cued by the nonpredictive stimulus, 
the best strategy during this task was to maintain central fixation throughout (and 
participants were explicitly instructed to do so). The implication, then, is that the faster 
responses to congruent than incongruent dot probes observed in Experiment 1 might 
reflect relatively automatic shifts of attention towards stimuli experienced as being 
predictive during the categorization task, or away from those experienced as 
nonpredictive. This kind of automatic, stimulus-driven or exogenous attentional 
orienting can be contrasted with endogenous shifts of attention that are under the control 
of the participant (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984). 
Experiment 2 
The aims of Experiment 2 were twofold. The first aim was to replicate our novel finding 
of faster responding in the dot probe task when the probe appears in a location 
 15 
congruent with a stimulus that has been experienced as predictive of a categorization 
response. The second aim relates to the issue of automaticity, raised in the Discussion of 
Experiment 1. We argued there that during the dot probe task, there was no reason for 
participants to consciously shift their attention towards one stimulus rather than the 
other, and no advantage to be gained in doing so. Nevertheless it remains possible that 
they did so regardless, strategically orienting attention towards the predictive stimulus 
for some reason. If this is the case, and the dot probe data of Experiment 1 reflect a 
conscious strategy of shifting attention towards predictive stimuli, then providing more 
time to process the predictive status of the stimuli (in terms of a longer SOA between 
stimuli and probe in the dot probe task) should produce stronger or at least similar 
effects, assuming that such controlled strategies are time-consuming (see De Houwer, 
Hermans & Eelen, 1998; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986; Le Pelley, 
Calvini & Spears, 2013; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Experiment 2 investigated this issue 
by varying the SOA in the dot probe task as a within-subjects variable. 
Method 
Participants and apparatus.  Seventy-two University of Málaga students (47 
female) participated in exchange for course credit. They were tested in groups of up to 
ten at a time in a room containing ten semi-enclosed cubicles, using standard PCs with 
48.3cm monitors. Stimulus presentation was controlled by the Cogent 2000 toolbox 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) for MATLAB. Participants made all responses 
with the computer keyboard using their dominant hand. 
Stimuli.  The two green squares had red–green–blue colour values of (51, 255, 0) 
and (0, 102, 0), with sides subtending 9.0° visual angle from a distance of 60cm. The 
two oblique line stimuli comprised sets of thick (width = .86° visual angle) or thin 
(width = .01°) rightward-slanted blue lines, enclosed within a black square background 
with sides subtending 9.0°. Stimuli are shown in Supplementary Materials Figure S2. 
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These green square and oblique line stimuli were presented centrally in white 
square frames with sides subtending 13.1°, which were positioned either side of a small 
fixation cross that was located in the centre of the screen; the distance from the centre of 
the cross to the centre of each box subtended 9.0°. The dot probe was a white square 
with side length subtending 1.35°. This would appear superimposed centrally on one of 
the stimuli. The screen background was black. 
Design.  For half of the participants the shade of the green square determined the 
correct response in the categorization task (condition Green Predictive); for the other 
half, the thickness of the oblique lines determined the correct response (condition Lines 
Predictive). Particular values on each stimulus dimension (shade of green and thickness 
of lines) were randomly assigned to the labels shown in Table 1 for each participant. 
Procedure.  Initial instructions (in Spanish) described the categorization task. 
Participants were told that on each trial a pair of stimuli would appear and that they 
were required to make a response using either the up or down arrow keys, and that their 
task was to learn the correct response for each stimulus pair. Participants then 
completed a first phase of 32 categorization trials. This phase comprised four, eight-trial 
blocks, with each of the stimulus pairs in Table 1 appearing twice per block in random 
order; for each stimulus pair, the predictive stimulus appeared once on the left and once 
on the right. Incorrect responses produced the feedback message “Error! The correct 
response was [UP / DOWN]” which remained onscreen for 3s; correct responses were 
not followed by any explicit feedback. 
Participants then moved on to the first phase of the dot probe task. Instructions for 
this task were similar to those of Experiment 1, but participants were now told explicitly 
that, in order to respond to the square (the dot probe target) as quickly as possible, “it is 
best to ignore the figures” (i.e. the stimulus pair). Each dot probe trial began with 
presentation of a central fixation cross. After 500ms the stimulus pair appeared to either 
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side of this cross. After an SOA of either 250ms or 1000ms, the dot probe appeared 
superimposed on one of the stimuli. This probe remained until participants made the 
correct response (left arrow key for a target presented on the left; right arrow key for a 
target presented on the right). Immediately on making the correct dot probe response, 
the screen cleared, and the next trial began after an inter-trial interval of 1s. 
Each phase of the dot probe task contained 16 trials: 2 SOAs (250ms or 1000ms) 
× 4 stimulus pairs (see Table 1) × 2 trial types (target congruent with predictive stimulus 
versus target incongruent with predictive stimulus). Whether the predictive stimulus 
appeared on the left or right was randomly determined on each trial. 
After the first phase of the dot probe task, participants returned to the 
categorization task. Experiment 2 comprised eight alternations of the categorization task 
with the dot probe task. 
Results 
Three participants failed to achieve the criterion of 60% correct averaged over all the 
trials of the categorization task (two in condition Green Predictive and one in condition 
Lines Predictive). These participants’ data were excluded from further analysis. As for 
Experiment 1, data were collapsed across counterbalancing conditions Green Predictive 
and Lines Predictive; see Supplementary Materials for an analysis including condition 
(Green Predictive versus Lines Predictive) as a between-subjects factor. 
Figure 4 shows accuracy across training blocks of the categorization task. One-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant effect of block, F(31,2108) = 
65.3, ηp2 = .49, p < .001, with accuracy increasing across training. Collapsing across the 
blocks of each phase revealed that mean accuracy was significantly greater than chance 
(50%) in all phases, smallest t(68) = 11.3, all ηp2s > .65, all ps < .001. 
Dot probe trials were defined as correct if participants’ first response correctly 
corresponded to the position of the probe. Accuracy on the dot probe task was very 
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high, with a mean of 99.3 ± 0.15% (SEM) correct trials across all participants. 
In Experiment 1, the experiment program defined minimum and maximum RT 
limits of 150ms and 2000ms for the dot probe task, as responses faster or slower than 
these limits respectively were not permitted. For consistency, dot probe RTs in 
Experiment 2 that were below 150ms or above 2000ms were therefore excluded from 
analysis (0.24% and 0.01% of all trials respectively). As for the analysis of Experiment 
1, RTs were log-transformed and any log RTs lying more than three standard deviations 
from each participant’s mean were excluded as outliers (1.46% of all trials). As in 
Experiment 1, for each participant we calculated the median log RT for congruent and 
incongruent trials for each phase of the dot probe task (using data from correct trials 
only). These data were analysed as four epochs, with each epoch representing the 
averaged data from a consecutive pair of dot probe phases (recall that each such pair 
contained all of the 32 possible dot probe trial types); see Figure 5. 
At an SOA of 250ms, a cueing effect occurred with faster responses to the probe 
on congruent trials than incongruent trials across all epochs. In contrast, at an SOA of 
1000ms there was no clear cueing effect; RTs on congruent and incongruent trials were, 
on average, more similar. A (2) × (2) × (4) repeated measures ANOVA with factors of 
SOA, congruence and epoch revealed no significant main effect of congruence, F(1,68) 
= 1.71, ηp2 = .02, p = .20. Crucially, however, congruence interacted with SOA, F(1,68) 
= 4.17, ηp2 = .06, p = .045, indicating that the influence of congruence was significantly 
greater at 250ms SOA than at 1000ms. The main effect of SOA was significant, F(1,94) 
= 185, ηp2 = .73, p < .001, with faster responses on trials with 1000ms SOA 
(presumably because the longer SOA allowed more time for response preparation). The 
main effect of epoch was significant, F(3,204) = 2.83, ηp2 = .04, p = .040, although 
Figure 5 reveals no continuing pattern in changes of RT across epochs. Other 
interactions were nonsignificant, largest F(3,204) = 1.04, ηp2s < .012, ps > .38. 
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Analysis of simple effects (collapsing across epochs) revealed that the effect of 
congruence at 250ms SOA was significant, F(1,68) = 4.81, ηp2 = .07, p = .032, 
corresponding to an advantage of 5ms for congruent trials over incongruent trials. There 
was no effect of congruence at 1000ms SOA, F(1,68) = .16, ηp2 = .002, p = .69. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the cueing effect observed in Experiment 1 (faster responses on 
congruent than incongruent trials of the dot probe task), but only for trials with 250ms 
SOA. Trials with 1000ms SOA showed no difference in response times when the dot 
probe appeared in the location of the stimulus that was predictive in the categorization 
task, relative to when it appeared in the location of the nonpredictive stimulus. 
In the Introduction to Experiment 2 we argued that, if the cueing effect observed 
at short SOA reflected a conscious strategy of shifting attention towards predictive 
stimuli, then providing more time to process the predictive status of the stimuli should 
produce stronger or at least similar effects. In contrast, the data reveal that providing 
more time led to a significant weakening of the cueing effect. The implication is that the 
cueing effect observed at short SOA is not a consequence of a controlled, strategic 
process, but rather reflects an automatic process. This issue is taken up in the General 
Discussion. 
Experiment 3 
Attentional theories of associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; 
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) suggest that changes in attention to stimuli 
develop as a consequence of learning about the predictive status of those stimuli; that is, 
an attentional bias should develop incrementally as a function of how well participants 
have learned the various stimulus–response associations. Experiments 1 and 2 did not 
provide clear support for this prediction, in that the size of the attentional bias in the dot 
 20 
probe task remained similar across the course of each experiment (see Figures 3 and 5). 
However, this may be because in each case participants had received considerable 
training on the categorization task prior to the first phase of the dot probe task, such that 
the predictive status of the stimuli was already quite well established at this point. 
Figures 2 and 4 show that categorization accuracy in the final block of the first phase of 
the categorization task had reached a similar level to that maintained subsequently. 
Experiment 3 used a procedure that combined the categorization and dot probe 
task. This allowed us to assess more closely the development of the dot probe bias 
across the course of training, and thus provided a more thorough test of the suggestion 
that the size of the attentional bias should increase as function of learning about the 
predictive status of the stimuli. 
Combining the categorization and dot probe phases brings a further advantage. 
While the cueing effect at short SOA observed in Experiments 1 and 2 was significant, 
it was numerically small. This may be because any automatic attentional bias towards 
the predictive cue that is learned during the categorization task extinguishes to some 
extent over the trials of the following dot probe phase. If this was indeed the case, then 
combining the two tasks such that every dot probe trial is also a categorization trial 
would minimise the influence of extinction and hence should result in a larger cueing 
effect at short SOA. 
Experiment 3 also incorporated the SOA manipulation of Experiment 2, although 
this was now varied between-subjects rather than within subjects. Given the findings of 
Experiment 2, we expected to observe a cueing effect for participants with short SOA in 
the dot probe task, but no effect for participants with long SOA. 
Method 
Participants, apparatus and stimuli.  A total of 108 University of Málaga students 
(86 female) participated in exchange for course credit. Testing conditions, apparatus and 
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stimuli were as for Experiment 2. 
Design.  In Experiment 3, the SOA of the dot probe task was varied between-
subjects. For 53 participants, the SOA between presentation of the stimuli and the dot 
probe was 250ms; of these, 27 participants were in condition Green Predictive, and 26 
were in condition Lines Predictive. For the remaining 55 participants (27 in condition 
Green Predictive and 28 in condition Lines Predictive) the SOA was 1000ms. Particular 
values on each stimulus dimension (shade of green and thickness of lines) were 
randomly assigned to the labels shown in Table 1 for each participant. 
Procedure.  Initial instructions for the categorization task were as in Experiment 
2. After reading these instructions, participants completed a pretraining phase of 16 
categorization trials, with each of the stimulus pairs in Table 1 appearing four times in 
random order; for each stimulus pair, the predictive stimulus appeared twice on the left 
and twice on the right. Categorization feedback was as for Experiment 2. 
Following this pretraining phase, participants received further instructions 
explaining that subsequent trials would be more complicated: On each trial (i) a pair of 
stimuli would appear; (ii) a small white square (the dot probe) would then appear 
superimposed on one of these stimuli; (iii) participants should press the left arrow if the 
square appeared on the left stimulus, and the right arrow if it appeared on the right; (iv) 
once they had responded to the square, they should make a response to the stimulus pair 
using the up or down arrows as in the pretraining stage. Similarly to Experiment 2, 
participants were told that they should respond to the position of the dot probe as 
rapidly as possible, and that “In order to do so, it is best that you ignore the pair of 
figures until you have responded to the location of the square”. Finally, participants 
were told that occasionally an arrow would appear in the centre of the screen, and that 
when it did they should press the corresponding arrow key as rapidly as possible. These 
“arrow trials” were intended to further encourage participants to maintain central 
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fixation at the start of each trial, since unexpected targets could occasionally appear at 
this location. 
Figure 6 shows a schematic of a standard trial. Each such trial began with 
presentation of a central fixation cross. After 500ms the stimulus pair appeared to either 
side of this cross. After an SOA of either 250ms or 1000ms (depending on which 
between-subjects condition the participant had been allocated to), the dot probe 
appeared superimposed on one of the stimuli. This probe remained until participants 
made the correct response (left arrow key for a target presented on the left; right arrow 
key for a target presented on the right). Immediately on making the correct dot probe 
response, the probe disappeared and the message “UP or DOWN?” appeared. 
Participants then made a categorization response using the up or down arrow keys; 
feedback was administered as during the pretraining phase, and the next trial then began 
after an inter-trial interval of 1s. 
On “arrow trials”, the fixation cross appeared for 500ms, and was then replaced 
by a small arrow in the centre of the screen, which remained until participants made a 
response using one of the arrow keys. No feedback was provided for these responses. 
The next trial then began after an interval of 1s. 
Participants completed 15 blocks of trials. Each block contained 17 trials in 
random order – one arrow trial (with the direction of the arrow determined randomly), 
and every combination of the four trial types in Table 1 with the predictive stimulus 
appearing on the left or the right, and with the dot probe appearing on the left or the 
right (4×2×2 = 16 trials). Hence, as in previous experiments, the dot probe was equally 
likely to appear in the location of the predictive or the nonpredictive stimulus. 
Results 
Twelve participants failed to achieve the selection criterion of 60% correct when 
averaged over all the trials of the categorization task (five in condition Green Predictive 
 23 
and two in condition Lines Predictive with SOA = 250ms; three in condition Green 
Predictive and two in condition Lines Predictive with SOA = 1000ms). These 
participants’ data were excluded from further analysis. As for Experiments 1 and 2, data 
were collapsed across counterbalancing conditions Green Predictive and Lines 
Predictive; see Supplementary Materials for an analysis including condition (Green 
Predictive versus Lines Predictive) as a between-subjects factor. Data were analysed as 
five epochs, with each epoch representing the averaged data from three training blocks. 
Figure 7 shows accuracy of participants’ categorization responses. Accuracy rose 
steadily across the course of training, and was similar in participants who experienced 
an SOA of 250ms or 1000ms in the dot probe task. A 2 × (5) ANOVA with factors of 
SOA and epoch revealed a significant main effect of epoch, F(4,376) = 50.9, ηp2 = .35, 
p < .001, but no main effect of SOA, F(1,94) = 1.58, ηp2 = .02, p = .21, or interaction, 
F(4,376) = .34, ηp2 = .004, p = .85. (Note that that this analysis did not include the data 
from the pretraining phase because trials in this phase did not incorporate the dot probe 
task, and we are interested in how participants’ accuracy relates to their dot probe 
performance). 
Accuracy on the dot probe task was very high, with a mean of 99.3 ± .10% (SEM) 
correct trials across all participants. Dot probe RT data were processed as for 
Experiment 2. RTs below 150ms or above 2000ms were excluded (.06% and .92% of all 
trials respectively). RTs were then log-transformed and any log RTs lying more than 
three standard deviations from each participant’s mean were excluded as outliers (.63% 
of all trials). For each participant we calculated the median log RT for congruent and 
incongruent trials for each block of training (using data from correct trials only). These 
data were then averaged across epochs of three blocks; see Figure 8. 
At an SOA of 250ms, a clear cueing effect occurred with faster responses to the 
probe on congruent trials than incongruent trials, and the size of this effect increased 
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across epochs. In contrast, at an SOA of 1000ms there was no cueing effect; RTs on 
congruent and incongruent trials remained similar to one another across all epochs, but 
showed a general decrease as the experiment progressed. A 2 × (2) × (5) ANOVA with 
factors of SOA, congruence and epoch revealed a significant main effect of congruence, 
F(1,94) = 25.2, ηp2 = .21, p < .001, . Crucially, the effect of congruence interacted with 
SOA, F(1,94) = 20.5, ηp2 = .18, p < .001, indicating that the influence of congruence 
was significantly greater at 250ms SOA than at 1000ms. Congruence also interacted 
with epoch, F(4,376) = 3.67, ηp2 = .04, p = .006, with the influence of congruence 
tending to increase across epochs. The main effect of epoch was significant, F(4,376) = 
5.08, ηp2 = .05, p < .001, with RTs decreasing across epochs as participants became 
more familiar with the task. The SOA × epoch interaction was also significant, F(4,376) 
= 6.63, ηp2 = .07, p < .001, with the decrease in RT across epochs being greater for 
participants with 1000ms SOA than for those with 250ms. The main effect of SOA was 
significant, F(1,94) = 13.6, ηp2 = .13, p < .001, with faster responses in participants with 
1000ms SOA (presumably because the longer SOA allowed more time for response 
preparation). The three-way interaction did not reach significance, F(4,376) = 1.68, ηp2 
= .02, p = .15. 
This omnibus analysis was followed up by separate, pre-planned two-way 
ANOVAs using the data from each group of participants defined by SOA. For 
participants with 250ms SOA, there was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1, 
45) = 32.2, ηp2 = .42, p < .001, with shorter RTs on congruent than incongruent trials. 
The observed mean difference in log RTs between congruent and incongruent trials 
corresponds to an RT difference of 46ms. The congruence × epoch interaction was 
significant, F(4,180) = 5.20, ηp2 = .10, p < .001, with the size of the congruence effect 
tending to increase across epochs, showing a significant linear trend, F(1, 45) = 14.8, 
ηp2 = .25, p < .001. Simple effects analysis revealed that the effect of congruence was 
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significant in every epoch, smallest F(1,45) = 4.57, all ηp2s > .09, all ps < .038. The 
main effect of epoch was not significant, F(4,180) = 1.62, ηp2 = .03, p = .17. For 
participants with 1000ms SOA, there was no main effect of congruence, F(1,49) = .19, 
ηp2 = .004, p = .67, and no congruence × epoch interaction, F(4,196) = .69, ηp2 = .07, p 
= .60. The main effect of epoch was significant for these participants, F(4,196) = 10.6, 
ηp2 = .37, p < .001. 
The analysis described above demonstrated that the cueing effect at 250ms SOA 
increased across epochs. A further analysis tested the more specific question of whether 
this effect increased as a function of accuracy on the categorization task. For each 
participant in the 250ms SOA group, we calculated the Spearman’s rank correlation 
between categorization accuracy and the size of the cueing effect (incongruent RT 
minus congruent RT) across epochs. One participant was excluded from this analysis as 
their categorization accuracy was equal in all epochs, such that no correlation could be 
calculated. The mean correlation across remaining participants was (5) = .20, with a 
standard error of .07. A one-sample t-test revealed that this mean correlation was 
significantly greater than zero, t(44) = 2.67, ηp2 = .14, p = .010, demonstrating that the 
cueing effect was indeed correlated with categorization performance. 
Finally, performance on the occasional “arrow trials” was similar in both SOA 
groups. Mean accuracy on arrow trials was 97.8  1.48% for the 250ms SOA group, and 
99.5 ± .26% for the 1000ms SOA group; this difference was not significant, t(95) = 
1.14, ηp2 = .01, p = .26. Mean RT on arrow trials was 667 ± 16ms for the 250ms SOA 
group, and 683 ± 14ms for the1000ms SOA group; this difference was not significant, 
t(95) =.77, ηp2 = .006, p = .44. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the key findings of Experiment 2: a significant cueing effect in 
the dot probe task at 250ms SOA, but no cueing effect at 1000ms SOA. Moreover the 
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cueing effect at 250ms was significantly greater than that at 1000ms SOA. And 
combining the categorization and dot probe tasks produced a cueing effect at short SOA 
that was numerically larger than that observed in Experiments 1 and 2 (46ms, as 
compared to 14ms in Experiment 1 and 5ms in Experiment 2). This is consistent with 
the suggestion that the effects in our earlier studies were smaller due to extinction of 
previously-learned attentional biases during the dot probe task. 
Importantly, in Experiment 3 the cueing effect at short SOA increased over the 
course of training, and more specifically increased as a function of the accuracy of 
participants’ categorization responses. This finding is consistent with the suggestion 
made by attentional theories of associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 
2004; Mackintosh, 1975) that learning about the predictive status of stimuli drives 
changes in attention to those stimuli. 
General Discussion 
Three experiments used a dot probe task to demonstrate that learning about the 
predictiveness of stimuli influences attentional orienting to those stimuli. In all 
experiments, when a short SOA was used in the dot probe task (350ms in Experiment 1; 
250ms in Experiments 2 and 3), participants were faster to respond to the dot probe 
when it appeared in the same location as a stimulus that had previously been 
experienced as predictive in a categorization task, than when it appeared in the location 
of a stimulus experienced as nonpredictive. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this cueing 
effect increased in magnitude as performance on the categorization task improved. 
The cueing effect occurred even though the short SOA meant that participants had 
little time to shift attention to the location of the predictive stimulus, and even though 
there was no advantage to be gained in so doing. Indeed, in Experiments 2 and 3 
participants were explicitly informed that the best strategy was to ignore the stimulus 
pair until after they had responded to the dot probe, and unpredictable “arrow trials” 
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were included in Experiment 3 to encourage participants to try to maintain attention to 
the central fixation point during the dot probe task. The fact that a cueing effect was still 
observed under these conditions suggests that the source of this effect was a relatively 
rapid, automatic process. 
This suggestion is further supported by the finding of Experiments 2 and 3 that 
increasing the SOA to 1000ms did not increase or even maintain the cueing effect, as 
might be expected if this effect reflected a conscious strategy of shifting attention 
towards predictive stimuli (see De Houwer et al., 1998; Fazio et al., 1986; Le Pelley, 
Calvini, et al., 2013; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Instead, increasing SOA led to a 
significant reduction in the cueing effect (and in fact eliminated it entirely). It is true 
that in both Experiments 2 and 3 there was a difference in baseline response time, with 
faster responses at long SOA than short SOA, raising the possibility that the failure to 
observe a cueing effect at long SOA might simply be a consequence of a floor effect in 
response times. However, this seems unlikely. Firstly, response times at 1000ms SOA 
decreased significantly across epochs in Experiment 3. Hence it is clear that response 
times were not at floor in the earlier epochs, and yet there was no hint of a congruency 
effect at 1000ms SOA in these epochs (while there was a significant effect at 250ms 
SOA). Secondly, mean response time for the dot probe task at 1000ms SOA in 
Experiment 3 was longer than at 250ms SOA in Experiment 2 (6.24 logms vs 5.92 
logms, or 514ms vs 374ms; see Figures 8 and 5). And yet a congruence effect was 
observed for the short response times at 250ms SOA in Experiment 2, but not for the 
longer response times at 1000ms SOA in Experiment 3. Hence it seems unlikely that the 
failure to observe a congruence effect at 1000ms SOA in Experiment 3 reflects a lack of 
sensitivity at this level of baseline response time. 
Instead, we suggest that the cueing effect at short SOA reflects the operation of an 
automatic attentional process. That is, presentation of the stimuli leads to a rapid, 
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automatic orienting of attention to the predictive stimulus2, producing the cueing effect 
at short SOA. One possibility that can account for the current data is that, during the 
longer SOA, this initial automatic attentional influence decays and hence attention 
returns to the centre of the display, such that no cueing effect is seen at long SOA (cf. 
Fazio et al., 1986). However our favoured account appeals instead to an interaction 
between automatic and controlled attentional processes (cf. Klauer, Roßnagel & Musch, 
1997). Participants in the current task knew that the best strategy was to attend centrally 
during the dot probe task. On this account, the long SOA provides sufficient time for 
participants to use controlled processes to correct for and overcome the automatic 
attentional orienting caused by presentation of the stimuli, returning attention to the 
centre of the display. This latter account has the advantage that it is also able to account 
for the persistence of greater attention to predictive cues that is typically observed 
during categorization training using eye tracking (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2011). During 
categorization training in these studies there is no particular reason for participants to 
try to maintain central fixation.  Consequently—and unlike in the dot probe task of the 
current study—there is no drive for them to use controlled processes to overcome an 
initial automatic tendency to attend to the predictive stimuli, and hence this tendency 
will persist over a longer period. 
Attentional theories of associative learning (e.g., Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 
2004; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) share the central dogma that learning 
about the predictiveness of stimuli influences attention to those stimuli. As noted in the 
Introduction, the majority of studies that have been conducted to test this idea have used 
the rate of learning about stimuli as a proxy measure of attention. This approach, 
however, leaves such studies open to interpretation in non-attentional terms, for 
example in terms of differences in the strength of mnemonic representations. By using a 
more direct measure of attentional orienting, the current studies provide a more direct 
 29 
test—and confirmation—of this central dogma of attentional theories. These data add to 
research that has used eye gaze as a measure of the influence of learning about 
predictiveness on overt attention (Beesley & Le Pelley, 2010; Kruschke et al., 2005; Le 
Pelley et al., 2011; Wills et al., 2007). However, the current dot probe procedure has 
certain important advantages over these previous studies using eye gaze (see also 
Livesey, Harris & Harris, 2009). In particular, it meets the criteria laid down in the 
Introduction. Firstly, we have used the dot probe procedure to demonstrate the 
incremental development of an attentional bias in a task (dot probe) that is incidental to 
the task that produces that bias (categorization); indeed, there is no need for participants 
to pay attention to the stimuli at all during the dot probe task. Secondly, the dot probe 
procedure does not rely on movements of eye fixation, which may or may not 
accompany shifts of attention (Jonides, 1981; Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1999). Thirdly, it 
does not require expensive, intrusive or cumbersome equipment, and can be 
implemented on any standard computer (including laptops or tablets which could be 
used outside the laboratory) and used with multiple participants simultaneously. Beyond 
these criteria, the dot probe procedure also allowed us to test the automaticity of the 
attentional bias produced by learned predictiveness by varying the SOA; studies of eye 
gaze have not so far provided evidence relating to this issue. 
Discriminating between attentional theories of associative learning 
Up to this point, “attentional theories” of learning have been treated as a single generic 
class of model, but in fact different attentional theories take a rather different view of 
the relationship between predictiveness and attention. The current experiments were 
introduced from the perspective of the class of attentional theory exemplified by 
Mackintosh’s (1975) model (see also Kruschke, 2003), which proposes that more 
attention is devoted to cues that are more accurate predictors of the current outcome 
(here category membership) than those that are less predictive. Clearly models taking 
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this approach are well-equipped to account for the congruence effect observed in the 
current experiments. 
However, an alternative attentional account was proposed by Pearce and Hall 
(1980), who suggested that more attention will be devoted to stimuli that are followed 
by surprising outcomes, than to stimuli that are followed by well-predicted and hence 
unsurprising outcomes. This account is less successful when applied to the current data. 
In its original formulation, this model states that what is crucial for determining 
attention is not how surprising the outcome is given the presence of a particular, 
individual stimulus, but rather how surprising the outcome is given the combination 
(compound) of all currently presented stimuli. In the categorization design used here 
(Table 1), all compounds are equally predictive of category membership (e.g., the 
compound “Gre1 & Lin2” belongs to the same category on all training trials), and hence 
the outcome occurring on each trial is equally surprising. Consequently, Pearce and 
Hall’s model predicts that all stimuli will maintain equal attention throughout the 
experiment, which is at odds with the dot probe data of the current experiments. 
Certain studies of the influence of predictiveness on the rate of novel learning 
about a stimulus, conducted in non-human animals, are consistent with the approach 
suggested by Pearce and Hall, and inconsistent with Mackintosh’s model (see Le Pelley, 
2004, for a review). However, studies with humans that are able to decide between these 
models have generally produced results consistent with Mackintosh’s account (e.g., 
Bonardi et al., 2005; Kruschke, 1996; Le Pelley et al., 2011; Le Pelley & McLaren, 
2003; Le Pelley, Turnbull, et al., 2010; see Le Pelley, 2010, for a review), and the 
current data add to this collection. 
Conclusion 
When considering the factors that influence attention, in addition to thinking about 
intrinsic properties of the stimulus (e.g., its size, colour, onset, or emotional valence), 
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and the external factors of rewarding attention to a particular stimulus, it would seem 
that we also need to consider stimulus and reward properties in combination. That is, 
learning of an association between a particular stimulus and a particular reward (or 
outcome, or category membership) will also influence the attention that is devoted to 
that stimulus in future. The current studies demonstrate that learning about the 
predictiveness of stimuli produces a relatively automatic attentional bias with respect to 
those stimuli; a bias that is consistent with the pattern anticipated by some of the most 
influential attentional theories of associative learning. 
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Footnotes 
 
1  Notably, in such studies all stimuli are typically followed by equally-valued outcomes 
on all trials, and hence do not differ in terms of their learned value. The stimuli differ 
only in terms of the accuracy with which they predict which specific outcome will 
occur, i.e. in terms of their learned predictiveness. This is also the case in the 
experiments described in the current article. 
 
2  Or, potentially, an automatic shift of attention away from the nonpredictive stimulus. 
The current experiments do not allow us to decide between an account in which 
participants learn to shift attention towards predictive stimuli, or away from 
nonpredictive stimuli (or both). That said, one might expect that the cueing effect 
produced by a shift away from the nonpredictive stimulus would be very weak, since 
attention could potentially shift away from this stimulus in any direction. In other 
words, a shift away from the nonpredictive stimulus will not necessarily be a shift 
towards the location of the predictive stimulus (where the dot probe target will appear). 
 33 
References 
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011). Value-driven attentional capture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
108, 10367-10371. 
Beesley, T., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2010). The effect of predictive history on the learning 
of sub-sequence contingencies. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 
108-135. 
Beesley, T., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2011). The influence of blocking on overt attention and 
associability in human learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 37, 114-120. 
Bonardi, C., Graham, S., Hall, G., & Mitchell, C. J. (2005). Acquired distinctiveness 
and equivalence in human discrimination learning: Evidence for an attentional 
process. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 88-92. 
De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., & Eelen, P. (1998). Affective and identity priming with 
episodically associated stimuli. Cognition & Emotion, 12, 145-169. 
Della Libera, C., & Chelazzi, L. (2006). Visual selective attention and the effects of 
monetary rewards. Psychological Science, 17, 222-227. 
Della Libera, C., & Chelazzi, L. (2009). Learning to attend and to ignore is a matter of 
gains and losses. Psychological Science, 20, 778-784. 
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the 
automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 
229-238. 
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., & Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary covert orienting is 
contingent on attentional control settings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 18, 1030-1044. 
 34 
Gauntlett-Gilbert, J., Roberts, R. C., & Brown, V. J. (1999). Mechanisms underlying 
attentional set-shifting in Parkinson's disease. Neuropsychologia, 37, 605-616. 
Hampshire, A., & Owen, A. M. (2010). Clinical studies of attention and learning. In C. 
J. Mitchell & M. E. Le Pelley (Eds.), Attention and associative learning: From brain 
to behaviour (pp. 385-406). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L., & Theeuwes, J. (2010). Reward changes salience in human 
vision via the anterior cingulate. Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 11096-11103. 
Honey, R. C., Close, J., & Lin, E. (2010). Acquired distinctiveness and equivalence: A 
synthesis. In C. J. Mitchell & M. E. Le Pelley (Eds.), Attention and Associative 
Learning: From Brain to Behaviour (pp. 159-186). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jonides, J. (1981). Voluntary versus automatic control over the mind's eye's movement. 
In J. B. Long & A. D. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and Performance IX (pp. 187-203). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Kiss, M., Driver, J., & Eimer, M. (2009). Reward priority of visual target singletons 
modulates event-related potential signatures of attentional selection. Psychological 
Science, 20, 245-251. 
Klauer, K. C., Roßnagel, C., & Musch, J. (1997). List-context effects in evaluative 
priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
23, 246-255. 
Kruschke, J. K. (1996). Dimensional relevance shifts in category learning. Connection 
Science, 8, 225-247. 
Kruschke, J. K. (2003). Attention in learning. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 12, 171-175. 
Kruschke, J. K., Kappenman, E. S., & Hetrick, W. P. (2005). Eye gaze and individual 
differences consistent with learned attention in associative blocking and 
 35 
highlighting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 31, 830-845. 
Le Pelley, M. E. (2004). The role of associative history in models of associative 
learning: A selective review and a hybrid model. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 57B, 193-243. 
Le Pelley, M. E. (2010). Attention and human associative learning. In C. J. Mitchell & 
M. E. Le Pelley (Eds.), Attention and Associative Learning: From Brain to 
Behaviour (pp. 187-215). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Le Pelley, M. E., Beesley, T., & Griffiths, O. (2011). Overt attention and predictiveness 
in human associative learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 37, 220-229. 
Le Pelley, M. E., Calvini, G., & Spears, R. (2013). Learned predictiveness influences 
automatic evaluations in human contingency learning. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 66, 217-228. 
Le Pelley, M. E., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2003). Learned associability and associative 
change in human causal learning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
56B, 68-79. 
Le Pelley, M. E., Mitchell, C. J., & Johnson, A. M. (2013). Outcome value influences 
attentional biases in human associative learning: Dissociable effects of training and 
of instruction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 39, 
39-55. 
Le Pelley, M. E., Reimers, S. J., Calvini, G., Spears, R., Beesley, T., & Murphy, R. A. 
(2010). Stereotype formation: Biased by association. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 139, 138-161. 
 36 
Le Pelley, M. E., Suret, M. B., & Beesley, T. (2009). Learned predictiveness effects in 
humans: A function of learning, performance, or both? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 35, 312-327. 
Le Pelley, M. E., Turnbull, M. N., Reimers, S. J., & Knipe, R. L. (2010). Learned 
predictiveness effects following single-cue training in humans. Learning & 
Behavior, 38, 126-144. 
Livesey, E. J., Harris, I. M., & Harris, J. A. (2009). Attentional changes during implicit 
learning: Signal validity protects a target stimulus from the attentional blink. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 408-422. 
Mackintosh, N. J. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli 
with reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82, 276-298. 
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 15-20. 
Mitchell, C. J., Griffiths, O., Seetoo, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2012). Attentional 
mechanisms in learned predictiveness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Behavior Processes, 38, 191-202. 
Mitchell, C. J., & Le Pelley, M. E. (Eds.). (2010). Attention and associative learning: 
From brain to behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Morris, R. W., Griffiths, O., Le Pelley, M. E., & Weickert, T. W. (2012). Attention to 
irrelevant cues is related to positive symptoms in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin. 
Oswald, C. J. P., Yee, B. K., Rawlins, J. N. P., Bannerman, D. B., Good, M., & Honey, 
R. C. (2001). Involvement of the entorhinal cortex in a process of attentional 
modulation: Evidence from a novel variant of an IDS/EDS procedure. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 115, 841-849. 
 37 
Owen, A. M., Roberts, A. C., Polkey, C. E., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (1991). 
Extra-dimensional versus intra-dimensional set shifting performance following 
frontal-lobe excisions, temporal-lobe excisions or amygdalo-hippocampectomy in 
man. Neuropsychologia, 29, 993-1006. 
Pearce, J. M., & Hall, G. (1980). A model for Pavlovian conditioning: Variations in the 
effectiveness of conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological Review, 
87, 532-552. 
Posner, M. I. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 32, 3-25. 
Posner, M. I., & Cohen, Y. (1984). Components of visual orienting. In H. Bouma & D. 
Bouwhuis (Eds.), Attention and Performance X (pp. 531-556). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Posner, M. I., Nissen, M. J., & Ogden, W. C. (1978). Attended and unattended 
processing modes: The role of set for spatial location. In H. L. Pick & I. J. Saltzman 
(Eds.), Modes of perceiving and processing information. (pp. 137-157). Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum. 
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In R. L. Solo 
(Ed.), Information processing and cognition: The Loyola Symposium (pp. 55-85). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
Posner, M. I., Snyder, C. R. R., & Davidson, B. J. (1980). Attention and the detection of 
signals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 160-174. 
Sincich, T. (1986). Business statistics by example. San Franscisco, CA: Dellen. 
Tamir, M., & Robinson, M. D. (2007). The happy spotlight: Positive mood and 
selective attention to rewarding information. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 33, 1124-1136. 
 38 
Wills, A. J., Lavric, A., Croft, G. S., & Hodgson, T. L. (2007). Predictive learning, 
prediction errors, and attention: Evidence from event-related potentials and eye-
tracking. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 843-854. 
Yeshurun, Y., & Carrasco, M. (1999). Spatial attention improves performance in spatial 
resolution tasks. Vision Research, 39, 293-306. 
 
 
 39 
Author note 
 
This work was supported by grants FT100100260 from the Australian Research Council 
and P11-SEJ-7898 from the Andalusian Government (Spain). 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mike Le Pelley, 
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia. 
Email: m.lepelley@unsw.edu.au 
 
 40 
Table 1.  Design of the categorization task. 
 
Stimulus pair 
Correct response  
Green predictive Lines predictive 
Gre1 & Lin1 R1 R1 
Gre1 & Lin2 R1 R2 
Gre2 & Lin1 R2 R1 
Gre2 & Lin2 R2 R2 
 
 
Note: Gre1 and Gre2 refer to squares filled with slightly different shades of green; Lin1 
and Lin2 refer to oblique lines at slightly different orientations (Experiment1), or lines 
with different thicknesses (Experiment 2). Particular values on each dimension were 
randomly assigned to these labels for each participant. R1 and R2 refer to two distinct 
responses. The correct response for each stimulus pair is shown for participants in the 
“green predictive” condition (in which the shade of green was predictive of the correct 
response while the orientation of the oblique lines was nonpredictive) and the “lines 
predictive” condition (in which the orientation [Experiment 1] or thickness [Experiment 
2] of the oblique lines was predictive of the correct response while the shade of green 
was nonpredictive). 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1.  Schematic example of the sequence of events on a target-present trial of the 
dot probe task in Experiment 1. The grey square in the cue display represents one of the 
green squares that could be used as cue stimuli, and the striped square represents one of 
the sets of oblique lines. 
Figure 2.  Mean percent correct categorization responses across the 20 blocks of 
Experiment 1. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Blocks 1-12 constituted 
Phase 1, and blocks 13-20 constituted Phase 2. Dotted line shows level of performance 
expected by chance (50% correct). 
Figure 3.   Log-transformed response time to appearance of the probe on target-present 
trials of the dot probe task of Experiment 1. Congruent = probe appeared in location 
cued by predictive stimulus from categorization task; Incongruent = probe appeared in 
location cued by nonpredictive stimulus from categorization task. 
Figure 4.  Mean percent correct categorization responses across the 32 blocks of 
Experiment 2. Error bars show standard error of the mean. The level of performance 
expected by chance is 50% correct. Each four blocks constituted one phase of the 
categorization task (i.e., blocks 1-4 constituted Phase 1, blocks 5-8 constituted Phase 2, 
etc.). 
Figure 5.  Log-transformed response time to the dot probe in Experiment 2 for trials 
with a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 250ms or 1000ms. Congruent = probe 
appeared in location cued by predictive stimulus from categorization task; Incongruent 
= probe appeared in location cued by nonpredictive stimulus from categorization task. 
Each of Epochs 1 to 4 comprises two consecutive phases of the dot probe task (i.e., 
Phases 1 and 2 constitute Epoch 1, Phases 3 and 4 constitute Epoch 2 etc.). Hence each 
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epoch contains exactly one example of each of the 32 possible dot probe trial types; see 
text for explanation. 
Figure 6.  Schematic example of the sequence of events on a standard trial of 
Experiment 3. The grey square in the cue display represents one of the green squares 
that could be used as cue stimuli, and the striped square represents one of the sets of 
oblique lines. The duration of the stimulus display (and hence the stimulus-onset 
asynchrony of the dot probe task) was varied between subjects. 
Figure 7.  Mean percent correct categorization responses across Experiment 3 for 
participants who experienced a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 250ms or 1000ms 
in the dot probe task. Pre = pretraining phase; each of Epochs 1 to 5 comprises three 
blocks of 16 trials. Error bars show standard error of the mean. The level of 
performance expected by chance is 50% correct. 
Figure 8.  Log-transformed response time to the dot probe in Experiment 3 for 
participants who experienced a stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 250ms or 1000ms 
in this task. Congruent = probe appeared in location cued by predictive stimulus from 
categorization task; Incongruent = probe appeared in location cued by nonpredictive 
stimulus from categorization task. Each of Epochs 1 to 5 comprises three blocks of 16 
trials. 
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